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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: 'The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ..., 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction^]"2 This is an appeal from the final judgment 
of the Third District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provide that the Supreme Court may transfer any 
matter over which it has original appellate jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether jurisdiction over a non-resident is conferred by Utah's Unsolicited 
Commercially and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah's Long Arm Statute, or some other 
manner for the sending of an email which violates the Act. 
2. Whether the lower court committed error by dismissing this case for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. 
3. Whethei the Court should have allowed discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) to 
occur, when in fact, there had been no discovery in the case. 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. 
2
 Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)0) (1953, as amended). 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court should review the legal conclusions of the trial court (since this was a 
summary judgment it was resolved in toto upon legal conclusions) for correctness. 
"Generally, we review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according the trial 
court no particular deference." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P 11, 
54 P.3d 1177, 1181 (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). 
This Court should review the statutory interpretations of the Third District Court for 
correctness. "We review the district court's statutory interpretations for correctness." Davis 
County Solid Waste Mgmt. v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, P 9, 52 P.3d 1174. "We look 
first to the statute's plain language as evidence of the legislature's intent, and give effect to 
that plain language unless the statute is ambiguous." Id. at P 10. "We analyze the language 
of a statutory provision in light of other provisions within the same statute or act, and we 
attempt to harmonize the provisions in accordance with the legislative intent so as to give 
meaning to each provision." Id. 
The standard for granting a motion to dismiss requires the Court to determine that 
there is no state of facts which might be proven that would allow Plaintiff to any kind of 
relief. See, e.g., Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah. App. 1990); 
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n. v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co. 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). 
Further, all allegations contained in the Plaintiffs pleadings must be accepted as true, and 
all inferences drawn in favor of Plaintiff when deciding the matter. See, e.g., Colman v. 
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Utah State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
841 P.2d 742 (Utah App. 1992); Prows v. State, 822 P. 2d 764 (Utah 1991). "When the 
court rules on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without 
holding an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal 
jurisdiction to defeat the motion. Rainy Day Books, Inc. v. Rainy Day Books & Cafe, L.L. C., 
186 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (D.Kan. 2002). With that standard in mind, Plaintiffs complaint 
should not be dismissed as Defendant's have failed to show there is no state of facts which 
would allow Plaintiff to the relief sought. 
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f): 
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may 
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as 
is just." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This case involves the sending of an unsolicited commercial email by Players 
Vacation Club, Inc.. (Defendant/Appellee/Players) to Frank Amyx 
(Plaintiff/Appellant/Amyx) for which Amyx brought this action in accordance with the 
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Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act found in Utah Code Annotated §§ 
13-36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002) (the "Statute"). This is a case of first impression. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
Amyx filed this action in the Third District Court, Sandy Division on January 30, 
2003 alleging that Players sent or caused to be sent to Amyx an unsolicited commercial 
email in violation of the Statute. See Court Record (Ct. Rec.) p. 1-4. On May 28, 2003, 
Players filed its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, with supporting 
memoranda and the Affidavit of Robert L. Gautereaux. See Ct. Rec. p. 8-22. On June 9, 
2003, Amyx filed his memorandum in opposition to motion to dismiss. Ct. Rec. p. 23-39. 
Defendant filed it's reply memorandum on June 19, 2003. See Ct. Rec. p 40-50. 
On June 20, 2003, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Relief under Rule 56(f) along with 
a supporting memorandum. See Ct. Rec. p. 54-59. Defendant filed an oppositional 
memorandum on July 1, 2003. See Ct. Rec. p. 63-67. Amyx filed his Reply along with the 
Affidavit of Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. on July 11, 2003. See Ct. Rec. p. 68-73. 
Without hearing, the lower court entered it's Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion to dismiss on Jurisdictional Ground and denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Continuance under Rule 56(f) on March 10, 2004. See Ct. Rec. p. 89-98. 
Amyx filed his Notice of Appeal on that same date, March 10,2004 (Ct. Rec. pp. 99-
110) with the Utah Supreme Court which subsequently transferred this matter to this Court. 
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Facts established in the Record below: 
1. On or around October 2, 2002, Mr. Amyx received an unsolicited email sent 
by or at the behest of Defendant. The email advertised a "Guaranteed $5,000 credit line for 
all life's needs." See Ct. Rec. p. 4. 
2. The email did not have the characters: "ADV:" on the subject line. See Ct. 
Rec. p. 4. 
3. Mr. Amyx has never had any business or personal relationship with Players 
Vacation Club, Inc.. See Ct. Rec. p. 38. 
4. Players also operates as a business named "My Computer Club," which is a 
membership club which provides credit financing for the purchase of computers. See Ct. 
Rec. p. 21. 
5. Players never denied sending the email sent to Frank Amyx, rather they admit 
to having engaged another company to send emails such as those at issue in this appeal. See 
Ct. Rec. p. 22. 
6. Players advertises in the State of Utah. See Ct. Rec. pp. 4, 38, 21. 
7. None of the electronic messages sent contained the legal name of the 
Defendant. Ct. Rec. p. 4. 
8. None of the electronic messages sent contained the correct street address of 
the Defendant. Ct. Rec. p. 4. 
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9. None of the electronic messages sent contained a valid Internet domain name 
of the defendant. Ct. Rec. p. 4. 
10. Plaintiff did not register his personal information on Defendant's website, or 
request or consent to receive commercial offers and solicitations or give his permission to 
Defendant or any other third parties. Ct. Rec. p. 37-38. 
11. Plaintiff did not "opt-in" or affirmatively consent to receive information 
regarding Defendant's products and services from Defendant's website or from any other 
website controlled by Defendant. Ct. Rec. p. 37. 
12. On the date Plaintiff received the unsolicited instant spam Plaintiff did not 
have a pre-existing business or personal relationship with Defendant nor its marketing 
partners, affiliates and advertisers. Ct. Rec. p. 37. 
13. Plaintiff did not request nor consent to receive promotional offers/messages, 
as represented in the electronic email sent to Plaintiff by Defendant, at any time from the 
Defendant or its affiliates; nor did Plaintiff at anytime give permission to receive any 
commercial solicitation. Ct. Rec. p. 38. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Section 13-36-101, et seq., commonly known as the Unsolicited Commercial 
and Sexually Explicit Email Act, itself provides a party who has received emails in violation 
of the requirements of that statute the ability to bring an action against the entity who sent 
6 
or caused to be sent that email. Pursuant to the statute, jurisdiction is at least implied by 
providing a party with the ability to bring that action. 
2. Even if jurisdiction is not provided by Section 13-36-101, et seq., it is properly 
found against the Defendant in this case by Utah's long-arm statute, found in § 78-27-24 of 
the Utah Code, because there are sufficient minimum contacts and subjecting Defendant to 
jurisdiction where it sends its emails does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice." Jurisdiction should therefore be properly found in this case. 
3. Granting summary judgment when there are questions of fact and a Plaintiff 
seeking discovery was wrong. The Appellant's Rule 56(f) motion should have been granted. 
There remained some issues which required factual testimony and the resolution of facts in 
favor of the non-moving party which prevented summary judgment or which required 
discovery. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The Statute Itself Confers Jurisdiction Against Its Violators. 
The lower court erred in not conferring jurisdiction through Utah's Unsolicited 
Commercially and Sexually Explicit Email Act. Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-101 et seq. 
Section 13-36-105 of the Utah Code provides that "[f]or any violation of a provision of 
Section 13-36-103, an action may be brought by: (a) a person who received the unsolicited 
commercial email ... with respect to which the violation under Section 13-36-103 
occurred[.]" 
The defendant in this case fits directly within the confines of these provisions. The 
defendant sent, or caused to be sent an unsolicited commercial email through the 
intermediary of an email service provider. If he violated the provisions of the code, he 
availed himself of the jurisdiction here. It is difficult to imagine that the statute would not 
provide jurisdiction, especially given the language of the statute indicating the ability to 
bring an action. There is no qualification of jurisdiction, there is no qualification of meeting 
the requirements of a long-arm statute. It simply states that for any violation, an action may 
be brought. Id. The only logical inference is that jurisdiction is at least impliedly 
authorized by the statute. The lower court erred in this respect. 
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2. Even Without the Provisions of the Statute, This Court has Personal 
Jurisdiction Over the Defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the requirements for finding personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in Utah in, State ex rel WA. 2002 UT 127. In that 
decision the Utah Supreme Court explained that: 
'The proper test to be applied in determining whether personal jurisdiction 
exists over a nonresident defendant involved two considerations. First, the 
court must assess whether Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the 
nonresident defendant. This means that a court may rely on any Utah statute 
affording it personal jurisdiction, not just Utah's long-arm statute. Second, 
assuming Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident 
defendant, the court must assess whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports 
with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Id. at f 14. Not only does the language of the email statute appear to confer jurisdiction, 
defendant's actions also subject him to jurisdiction through Utah's long-arm statute. Utah's 
long-arm statute is found in Section 78-27-24 of the Utah Code Ann. and provides in 
relevant part that: 
"Any person,... whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person 
or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdictions 
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; ... 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty[.]" 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-24(1), (3). The "transaction of business within this state" is 
defined as "activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state 
which affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
9 
23(2). uThe Utah Supreme Court has applied a 'liberal and expansive construction' to the 
statutory definition of transacting business." Patriot Systems, Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. 
Supp. 2d 1318,1323 (D. Utah 1998) (citing Nova Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F.Supp. 1123, 
1126 (D. Utah 1986)). Defendant's actions clearly place them within the reach of this 
statute. Just with a review of the email and website directed to by the email, it is obvious 
that they have attempted to obtain new Utah customers. It is most probable that they already 
engage in sales within Utah, a fact which can be determined through discovery. Even if not 
already conducting business, Defendant has caused injury to the plaintiff, as evidenced by 
the violation of the Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act. This should 
be enough to place him within the reach of the long-arm statute. 
Additionally, the placement of the offending email was entirely commercially driven 
and meant to transact business within the state. See Ct. Rec. p. 4, 20-22, 37-38. This, 
alternatively, should be enough to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction within this 
state. There has been no denial that the email was sent to and received by at least the named 
plaintiff in the State of Utah. This fact must have been accepted as true for the lower court's 
decision. The nature of the offending email was entirely commercial in nature. See Ct. Rec. 
p. 4. This also, is not in dispute. This fact alone places the defendant and his actions within 
the reach of the long-arm statute. 
Furthermore, because long-arm statutes typically extend to the limits of due process, 
the Court need only consider whether exercising jurisdiction over defendants would be 
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consistent with the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-22. The Tenth Circuit uses a twofold inquiry to determine whether it is appropriate 
to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant through the due 
process analysis. See Rainy Day Books at 1162. "First, the court must determine whether 
the defendant has such minimum contacts with the forum state "that he should reasonable 
anticipate being haled into court there." Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). "Within this inquiry the court must determine 
whether the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum, (citing 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,, 476 (1985)), and whether the plaintiffs 
claims arise out of or result from "actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial 
connection with the forum State." Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court 
of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987)). "Second, if the defendant's actions create 
sufficient minimum contacts, the court must consider whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over defendant offends 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" 
Id. at 1162 (citing OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 
(10th Cir. 1998)). 
A. There are Minimum Contacts. 
These requirements have now been applied to situations very similar to this, where 
a plaintiff has sought jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant because of actions that 
occurred over the Internet. In this vein, courts in Utah have acknowledged that "a website 
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may form the basis of personal jurisdiction." iAccess, Inc. v. WEBcard Technologies, Inc., 
182 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (D. UT 2002). Courts have also found that "[e]ven a single 
contact can support specific jurisdiction." American Eyewear, Inc. v. Peeper's Sunglasses 
and Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 895, 900 (N.D. Tex. 2000). To find personal 
jurisdiction over such contacts as were made in this case, courts in Utah "analyze the level 
and type of activity conducted on the website in question to determine jurisdiction." iAccess 
at 1186. "A passive website that does no more than make information available cannot by 
itself form the basis of jurisdiction." Id. (citations omitted). Defendant's website and the 
offending email are clearly not passive. See Ct. Rec. p. 4. The emails sent by the defendant 
to the plaintiff's email address are obvious solicitations to do business. Id. "Personal 
jurisdiction, however, is established where a 'defendant clearly does business over the 
Internet^]'" iAccess at 1187 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 
1119, 1124 (E.D. Pa. 1997)). 
In this case, defendant clearly was attempting to do business over the Internet. See 
Ct. Rec. p. 4,20-23, 37-38. The email sent to plaintiff was a direct and obvious solicitation 
to do business addressed to and received by a Utah resident and personal jurisdiction should 
have been found for that solicitation. Id. That is enough minimum contacts to satisfy the 
requirement. The U.S. Supreme Court evaluated this matter through a "stream of commerce" 
theory in Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 
(1987). In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
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"The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not 
an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. 
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve 
the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the 
market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing 
channels for providing regular advise to customers in the forum State, or 
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as 
a sales agent in the forum State." 
Id. at 107 (emphasis added). This is exactly what defendant's email was, advertisements in 
solicitation of commercial transactions. See Ct. Rec. p. 4, 29, 59, 88. The U.S. Supreme 
Court used that as evidence of purposeful availment in Asahi, and it should have been used 
as evidence of the same in this matter. 
It is unknown the amount of business the defendant carries on with Utah residents. 
What is known is that they at least solicit business from Utah residents. See Ct. Rec. p. 4, 
20-23, 37-38. Even if the amount of business defendant does is small, courts have used a 
relatively low threshold to find personal jurisdiction. The 6th Circuit Court in CompuServe, 
Inc. v Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), granted personal jurisdiction over a Texas 
defendant, even though he had claimed he had never been to Ohio, and had "sold less that 
$650.00 worth of his software to only (twelve) Ohio residents" over the Internet. Without 
discovery, the Court would never know if defendant's sales approach those in CompuServe. 
Additionally, there is no mention of the amount of revenue associated with purchases from 
Utah residents. The object of Mycomputerclub.com is obviously to sell computers. Those 
computers and accessories are delivered in some way to the purchasers. If there are 
purchasers in Utah, one would imagine there to be records of where that equipment was 
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delivered. Additionally, a part of Defendant's business is to provide the computer 
equipment on credit and allow purchasers to make full payment over time. There certainly 
must be records of where the payments are coming from or where bills and statements are 
being sent to. None of that was provided. It could only be obtained through proper 
discovery which was not allowed. This subject will be addressed in Section 3 below. It was 
error for the lower court not to find minimum contacts. 
Even in the event the Court does not find defendant's actions to be commercial, there 
is also a middle category of websites, of which Courts have also found the requirements for 
personal jurisdiction to be fulfilled. This category is known as "interactive" website. These 
are websites "where a user can exchange information with the host computer." Id. at 1187. 
If the actual website maintained by the defendant is not commercial in nature, it is at least 
interactive, as shown by the email sent by the defendant to the plaintiff. See Ct. Rec. p. 4. 
As is readily discerned, just from the copy printed and provided as an exhibit for the 
complaint, there is an obvious offer to do business. Id. The entire purpose of the email is 
to solicit the sale of a product sold by the defendant. Id. 
Courts have found jurisdiction over the operator of a website when not a single sale 
was made within the forum state. See Starmedia Network, Inc. v. Star Media, Inc., 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4870 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2001). In Starmedia, the court found that even 
though customers could not purchase products through the defendant's website, they "could 
register with the site and use the site to send comments to defendant." Id. at 1. This is 
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similar to the defendant's offending email. The commercial message sent solicits the sale 
of defendant's product through clicking on a certain area which would carry the user to the 
defendant's website for purchase of the product. See Ct. Rec. p. 85. The entire purpose of 
the message is to solicit the sale of defendant's products. Id. 
Courts have also found personal jurisdiction appropriate where just one email was 
sent. A Mississippi court recently found jurisdiction from the sending of just one email. See 
Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F.Supp. 773 (S.D. Miss. 2001). The court in that case 
subjected the defendant, who maintained a ''passive" web site, to personal jurisdiction. Id. 
The court stated that "the medium in the instant case is an e-mail, which as actively sent to 
the recipient in hopes that the recipient would read its contents and patronize the Web site 
it was promoting. Id. at 777. The court held that the injury occurred in Mississippi, when 
the e-mail was received and opened. Id. In analyzing whether the fairness and due process 
rights of the defendant, the court reasoned that, in sending the e-mail advertisement all over 
the world, the defendant: 
"had to have been aware that the e-mail would be received and opened in 
numerous fora, including Mississippi. Accordingly, the Court finds that it 
would ne neither "unfair" nor "unjust" to subject her to personal jurisdiction 
in Mississippi. By sending an e-mail solicitation to the far reaches of the 
earth for pecuniary gain, one does so at her own peril, and cannot then 
claim that it is not reasonably foreseeable that she will be haled into court 
in a distant jurisdiction to answer for the ramifications of that 
solicitation." 
Id. at 779-80 (emphasis added). This is exactly what the defendant has done in this 
situation. The defendant has placed on its website, and admittedly others, to be sent to the 
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computers of internet users such as the plaintiff, a solicitation, that in this case was sent to 
the plaintiff s computer here in Utah. That solicitation would be and probably has been sent 
to computer terminals all over the world, including to other Internet users in Utah. It was 
done for pecuniary gain. Therefore, he has done it at his own peril and now "cannot then 
claim that it is not reasonably foreseeable that [he] will be haled into court in [Utah]." 
Internet Doorway at 780. The lower court erred in not finding sufficient minimum contacts. 
B. The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Will Not Offend "Traditional 
Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice." 
This second inquiry "requires a determination of whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant with minimum contacts is 'reasonable' in light of the 
circumstances surrounding the case." Rainy Day Books at 1162. "This inquiry requires a 
determination of whether the ... court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
is reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding the case." Id. at 1162 (citing Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 476). To determine the reasonableness, the court will consider the 
following factors: "(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in 
resolving the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in receiving convenient and effective relief; 
(4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
Courts have found that, in this time of Internet communications, faxes, telephones, 
and relatively inexpensive travel, requiring defendant to litigate in this jurisdiction is not 
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constitutionally unreasonable. See Rainy Day Books, supra. In addition, just as the court 
in Rainy Day Books had a strong interest in adjudicating disputes involving infringement, 
the courts in Utah have a strong interest in adjudicating disputes in regard to situations like 
this. For this purpose, the Utah legislature saw fit to pass the statute this complaint was 
brought under. This forum does not appear to be more advantageous for the plaintiff, than 
another even though she is located here, as witnesses and evidence are to be found both in 
Utah and in Arizona. It does not seem unreasonable for the defendant to have to defend this 
suit in the location where he sent or caused to be sent defendant's spam. The lower court's 
decision is not in accordance with those principles and should be reversed. To adopt the 
court's ruling is to eviscerate the spam statute. If recipients of the spam are unable to bring 
actions as permitted by the statute, why have a statute. If neither the spam statute nor the 
State's long-arm statute provide jurisdiction, there simply is no possibility of enforcing the 
legislature's remedy for the spam problem. It is an incorrect result and cannot be the result 
intended by the legislature. The lower court's ruling should be reversed. 
It is further difficult to imagine how a prima facie case for jurisdiction was not 
established. No one questions the existence of the statute, which provides relief, nor do they 
question that the email was sent. The Utah legislature found it important enough an issue 
to pass into law a statute offering at least some protection from the onslaught of spam. The 
law was broken in Utah, Utah should be found with jurisdiction. There is no requirement 
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for any number of emails to be received in Utah, only one is necessary to find a violation. 
It seems only obvious that where there is a violation, there must also be jurisdiction. 
3. Appellant's Motion for Discovery under Rule 56(f) Should Have Been 
Granted. 
The standard for the grant or denial of summary judgment is well known: [S]ummary 
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Ut.R.Civ.P. 56(c). (If the movant bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact, the nonmovant may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific 
facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the 
burden of proof. See Waddoups v. The Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054 (Utah 2003). 
An issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier 
of fact could resolve the issue either way. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 
248[, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202] (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if under the 
substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. See Id. If a party that 
would bear the burden of persuasion at trial does not come forward with sufficient evidence 
on all essential elements of its prima facie case, all issues concerning all other elements of 
the claim and any defenses become immaterial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 
322-23[, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d265] (1986). 
18 
The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. 
See Celotex, Ml U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In so doing, a movant that will not bear the 
burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the nonmovant's claim. See Id. Such a movant 
may make its prima facie demonstration simply by pointing out to the court a lack of 
evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim. See Id. If the 
movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant that would bear the burden of persuasion 
at trial may not simply rest upon its pleadings; the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go 
beyond the pleadings and "set forth specific fact" that would be admissible in evidence in 
the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant. 
Ut.R.Civ.P. 56(e); See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fedn, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89[, 110 S.Ct. 
3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695] (1990); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, Ml 
U.S. at 248[, 106 S.Ct. 2505]. To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference 
to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein. See Thomas 
v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.) cert denied, 506 U.S. 
1013[, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566] (1992). Adlerv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144F.3d 
664,670-71 (10th Cir. 1998). 
In this case, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss before either party had any 
opportunity to begin taking discovery. The only evidence supplied was in the form of 
affidavit testimony which could only be seen as self-serving and incomplete. The language 
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of Toebleman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016 (3rd Cir. 1942) is 
particularly applicable to the instant case. 
'The case must, therefore, go back for further proceedings as to this cause of 
action in order to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to produce evidence of 
the facts necessary to support the relief for which they ask. It is obvious that 
this evidence must come largely from the defendants. This case illustrates the 
danger of founding a judgment in favor of one party upon his own version of 
facts within his sole knowledge as set forth in affidavits prepared ex parte. 
Cross-examination of the party and a reasonable examination of his records 
by the other party frequently bring forth further facts which place a very 
different light upon the picture. The plaintiffs should, therefore, be given a 
reasonable opportunity, under proper safeguards, to take the depositions and 
have the discovery which they seek." 
Id. at 1022. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for exactly this type of 
relief. That rule states: 
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on "numerous occasions that rule 56(f) motions 
opposing a summary judgment motion on the ground that discovery has not been completed 
should be granted liberally unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in merit." Salt Lake 
County v. Western Dairymen Coop, 48 P.3d 910 (Utah 2002) (citing Price Dev. Co. v. Orem 
City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000); CrosslandSav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994); and 
Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984)). 
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In this case, there were no interrogatories, no requests for admission, no requests for 
production, no depositions. These methods are necessary to flush out the facts and to 
determine plaintiffs claims on the merits, not on the pleadings. The Plaintiff made claims 
and the Defendant made its own claims in opposition creating a situation of 'he said, she 
said.' There was no flushing out of the facts, none was allowed. 
Discovery would have allowed the parties to determine several material facts, 
including the reality of the amount of business Defendant actually conducts in Utah, the 
number of solicitations it actually makes in Utah, and other insightful information regarding 
the business dealings Defendant has with Utah residents. Instead, the determination by the 
lower court was based entirely upon the self-serving affidavit of one party. The discovery 
process would be used to verify or contradict the testimony actually submitted. Because 
there was no discovery, there was no opportunity to do so, and there was no opportunity to 
dispute the allegations of the Defendant. That was improper. 
Plaintiff's motion was submitted in a timely fashion, with pertinent rationale and 
necessity. Notwithstanding that and the Utah Supreme Court's many findings that Rule 
56(f) motions should be granted liberally, in this case, it was not. Appellant respectfully 
requests this Court correct the lower court's error by remanding this matter for further 
discovery and determination. 
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CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellant respectfully requests this 
Court reverse the error made by the Third District Court in this matter and find Defendant 
to be properly subjected to jurisdiction in this State. 
" I " DATED this [ ^ day of July, 2004. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
Xenver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage prepaid, 
on the following: 
Randy L. Dryer 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
on this l^c day of July, 2004. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Players's Motion to Dismiss. 
2. Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah Code §§13-
36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002). 
ADDENDUM 1 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK AMYX, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PLAYERS VACATION CLUB INC, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No: 030401320 
Judge: ROYAL I HANSEN 
Date: 03/10/2004 
Clerk: lisam 
The Court ORDERS Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. This is the final Order of the Court and no 
additional filing is required. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
FRANK AMYX, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PLAYERS VACATION CLUB, INC., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 030401320 
Judge ROYAL I. HANSEN 
This matter comes before the Court on Players Vacation Club, Inc.'s (Defendant) motion 
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and Frank Amyx's (Plaintiff) Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) 
motion for relief. The Court concludes that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant 
and therefore, GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
BACKGROUND 
On October 2, 2002, Plaintiff received a solicitation by email for Defendant's products or 
services. The email did not comply with Utah's Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit 
Email Act, Utah Code § 13-36-101 et seq. (2002)(the Act), which imposes certain requirements 
on unsolicited commercial email messages and authorizes a civil cause of action for violation of 
the Act's requirements. 
On January 30, 2003, Plaintiff filed a law suit alleging a sole cause of action under the Act. 
On May 28, 2003, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
because Utah courts may not properly assert personal jurisdiction over Defendant under either the 
Act or Utah's long arm statute. Defendant claims that no Utah statute confers Utah courts with 
personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Neither the Act itself confers jurisdiction nor Utah's long 
arm statute. Specifically, Defendant argues that Defendant does not transact business in Utah, did 
not contract to supply services or goods in Utah and has caused no injury in Utah. Moreover, 
Defendant argues that to exercise personal jurisdiction over it would violate Defendant's due 
process rights and violate notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
In support of its motion, Defendant attaches Robert L. Gautereaux (Gautereaux) affidavit, 
Defendant's president. Gautereaux states that Defendant is a Nevada Corporation with its 
principal place of business in California. Defendant is a closely held corporation and has no 
shareholders who reside in Utah. Defendant is a membership club that provides credit financing 
for vacations. Defendant is a/k/a My Computer Club. My Computer Club maintains a passive 
website that merely makes information available to those who are interested in the information. 
Defendant does not maintain a registered agent in Utah. Defendant does not own, lease, or 
control any property, either real or personal in the state of Utah. Defendant does not maintain any 
employees, offices, agents, or bank accounts in the state of Utah. Defendant has no phone or 
facsimile listings within the state of Utah. Defendant does not market or advertise in Utah and 
does not particularly solicit Utah residents to view its website. Defendant does not send agents 
into Utah to conduct business, sell products, or visit customers. Defendant does not pay taxes in 
Utah. Defendant has no employees, and does not recruit employees in Utah or any other state. 
Defendant maintains no bank accounts or other financial arrangements in the state of Utah. 
Defendant does not use a Utah server to host its websit, rather it uses an internet based server to 
host its website. Defendant only sends emails to those persons who have given permission to 
receive emails or otherwise have a pre-existing business or personal relationship with Defendant. 
Gautereaux further states that Defendant did engage Venture Worldwide, Inc. to send 
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out emails like the one attached to Plaintiffs complaint to those recipients who had given 
permission to receive commercial email. Venture Worldwide, Inc. represented to Defendant that 
it would send email advertisements only to those who had given permission. 
On June 9, 2003, Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff 
argues that Defendant's filing its motion to dismiss is a general appearance, therefore, jurisdiction 
has been established. Plaintiff argues that the Act confers personal jurisdiction against Defendant. 
Even without the Act, Plaintiff argues that this Court has personal jurisdiction pursuant to Utah's 
long arm statute. Plaintiff argues that there are sufficient minimum contacts because Defendant 
sent Plaintiff, a Utah resident, an email that was direct and obviously a solicitation to do business, 
therefore, this Court has personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff also argues that when sending an email 
to anyone who has computer terminals all over the world,, and is done for pecuniary gain, then 
he does so at his own peril and now cannot claim that it is not reasonably foreseeable that he will 
be haled into court in Utah. Plaintiff further argues that the exercise of personal jurisdiction will 
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 
Attached to Plaintiffs opposition is his affidavit. Defendant states that he resides in the 
state of Utah where he received the email at issue. Defendant states that he did not give his 
permission nor did he have a pre-existing business or personal relationship with Defendant or My 
Computer Club. Defendant further states that he did not register his personal information on 
Defendant's website or request or consent to receive commercial offers and solicitations or give 
my permission to Defendant or any other third parties. Defendant states that he did not "opt-in" 
or affirmatively consent to receive information regarding Defendant's products and services at any 
time. 
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On June 19, 2003, Defendant filed its reply. Defendant argues that it has not consented to 
personal jurisdiction by filing its motion to dismiss because a special appearance is to contest a 
court's personal jurisdiction without submitting oneself to it, which is what Defendant's motion to 
dismiss is. Defendant argues that the Act does not confer personal jurisdiction over it because it 
does not refer in any way to the Court's power to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. 
Moreover, Defendant argues that the Utah long arm statute does not confer personal jurisdiction 
over it because the fact that a single email made its way to Utah does not demonstrate that 
Defendant has transacted business within the state of Utah. Defendant argues that exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over it would offend due process because there are insufficient minimum 
contacts for Defendant to purposefully avail itself and reasonably expect suit in Utah. 
Furthermore, Defendant argues that it would be manifestly unfair to subject Defendant to 
litigation in the state of Utah. 
On June 20, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Rule 56(f) motion for relief. In Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) 
motion he argues that the lawsuit was recently filed on a new Utah statute that has not been 
interpreted by the Court and no discovery has been conducted. Therefore, the Court should order 
a continuance to permit discovery. 
On June 31, 2003, Defendant filed its opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion for relief. 
Defendant argues that Rule 56(f) does not apply to Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss. Even 
assuming Rule 56(f) applied, Plaintiffs request is untimely and inadequate because Plaintiff failed 
to attach an affidavit to his motion to explain what discovery he deems would assist Plaintiff in 
opposing Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
On July 11, 2003, Plaintiff filed his reply, attached is counsel's affidavit. Counsel states 
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that a deposition of Gautereaux is necessary to question his statements regarding Defendant 
solicitation via email practices, outsource lists and statement made that Defendant " only sends 
emails to those persons who have given permission to receive emails or otherwise have pre-
existing business or personal relationship with [Defendant] " 
LAW 
Utah R Civ P 12(b)(2) provides a court may dismiss a law suit for lack of personal 
jurisdiction and such challenge may be supported with affidavits and still be treated as a motion to 
dismiss, unless the motion is based on subsection (6) for failure to state a claim, then it shall be 
treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 
Under Utah law, Plaintiff must make & prima facie case for assertion of jurisdiction over 
Defendant in order to proceed to trial on the merits Anderson v. American Society of Plastic & 
Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P 2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990) The Court may determine jurisdiction 
on affidavits alone, permit discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing Id. If, as here, the Court 
proceeds on documentary evidence alone, Plaintiffs factual allegations are accepted as true unless 
specifically controverted by the Defendant's affidavit Id. 
"[W]hen jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff cannot solely rely on allegations of jurisdiction 
in its complaint in the face of an affidavit by defendant which specifically contradicts those general 
allegations " Roskelley & Company v. Lercoy Inc., 610 P 2d 1307, 1308 (Utah 1980) 
The Act is silent with regard to exercise of jurisdiction, unlike other provisions of Utah 
law in which the legislature has expressly authorized the exercise of such jurisdiction, see, e.g., 
Utah Code § 78-3 a-110(13) The Court concludes that the logical inference is that the Act is 
limited to establishing a cause of action against those who violate its substantive requirements, but 
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only to the extent that the Court can properly exercise personal jurisdiction over such defendants. 
Utah's long arm statute is provided in Utah Code § 78-27-24, which provides: 
Any person . . .whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in 
person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits . . . 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising out of or related 
to: (1) the transaction of any business within this state; . . . (3) the causing of any 
injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of warranty . . . 
There are three general categories, or factual contexts, along a "sliding scale," as a means 
of evaluating personal jurisdiction based on internet activity. The first category involves those 
circumstances when "a defendant clearly does business over the internet," such as entering into 
contracts requiring the "knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the internet." 
ZippoMfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997). At the 
opposite end of the scale is a category involving cases where the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
is not appropriate, because the internet activity at issue involves "[a] passive Web site that does 
little more than make information available to those who are interested in it." Id. Under those 
circumstances, "a defendant has simply posted information on an internet Web site which is 
accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions." Id. Finally, the Zippo court identified a third, middle, 
category that encompasses "interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the 
host computer." Id. The Zippo court concluded that determining whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction is appropriate depends upon "the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the 
exchange of information that occurs on the Web site." Id. 
ANALYSIS 
The Court concludes that a Rule 56(f) motion for relief does not apply to a Rule 12(b) 
motion to dismiss. Here, Defendant attached an affidavit to its motion to dismiss for lack of 
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personal jurisdiction under 12(b)(2), therefore, the motion is not treated as a motion for summary 
judgment. Rule 56(f) applies to motions for summary judgment, which is not the motion before 
the Court. Nevertheless, even if Rule 56(f) did apply, the information that Plaintiff claims it 
would question Defendant about does not relate to personal jurisdiction of Defendant. 
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion for relief 
Defendant has directly controverted Plaintiffs general allegations of personal jurisdiction 
by way of affidavit. Plaintiff filed an affidavit in response, but does not controvert the statements 
of Defendant's affidavit. Plaintiff simply restates its claim that it received an unsolicited email. 
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to carry the minimal burden of establishing a prima 
facie case for personal jurisdiction. 
Even if Plaintiff met the prima facie burden, the Court further concludes that Utah law 
does not confer personal jurisdiction over Defendant, either under the Act or under Utah's long 
arm statute. Under the Zippo analysis, the facts of this case most closely resemble the second 
category described by that court. As such, it does not form the basis for personal jurisdiction over 
Defendant. Without more, the single email contact between Plaintiff and Defendant are 
inadequate to create personal jurisdiction. Although Plaintiff claims that he suffer "injury" 
because he viewed an unsolicited commercial email, the Act does not recognize any level of 
"injury" on the part of the recipient of an email; rather, it merely requires the initiator of such an 
email to comply with statutory requirements or face civil penalties. The Court is not persuaded 
that a violation of this regulatory requirement rises to the level of a tort within the meaning of 
Utah's long arm statute. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs bare allegations of "injury" are 
insufficient to assert long arm jurisdiction over Defendant. 
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The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and 
DENIES Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion for relief. 
ORDER 
The Court ORDERS Plaintiffs complaint be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
This is the final Order of the Court and no additional filing is required. 
So ORDERED this .16 day of March, 2004. 
By the Court: 
ROlfAO. HANSEN-.^ 
ThiilDistrict C o u r t a g e 
^••• . . ^ 
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ADDENDUM 2 
563 COMMERCE AND TRADE 13-36-103 
(5) whether the franchisees of the same line-make in 
that relevant market area are providing adequate service 
to consumers for the powersport vehicles of the line-make, 
which shall include the adequacy of the powersport vehi-
cle sale and service facilities, equipment, supply of vehicle 
parts, and qualified service personnel. 2002 
13-35-307. Franchisor's repurchase obl igat ions upon 
termination or noncont inuat ion of franchise. 
(1) Upon the termination or noncontinuation of a franchise 
by the franchisor, the franchisor shall pay the franchisee: 
(a) the franchisee's cost of new, undamaged, and unsold 
powersport vehicles in the franchisee's inventory acquired 
from the franchisor or another franchisee of the same 
line-make representing both the current model year at 
the time of termination or noncontinuation and the im-
mediately prior model year vehicles: 
(i) plus any charges made by the franchisor, for 
distribution, delivery, or taxes; 
(ii) plus the franchisee's cost of any accessories 
added on the vehicle shall be repurchased; and 
(iii) less all allowances paid or credited to the 
franchisee by the franchisor; 
(b) the cost of all new, undamaged, and unsold sup-
plies, parts, and accessories as set forth in the franchisor's 
catalog at the time of termination or noncontinuation for 
the supplies, parts, and accessories, less all allowances 
paid or credited to the franchisee by the franchisor; 
(c) the fair market value, but not less than the franchi-
see's depreciated acquisition cost of each undamaged sign 
owned by the franchisee that bears a common name, trade 
name, or trademark of the franchisor if acquisition of the 
sign was recommended or required by the franchisor. If a 
franchisee has a sign with multiple manufacturers listed, 
the franchisor is only responsible for its pro ra ta portion of 
the sign; 
(d) the fair market value, but not less than the fran-
chisee's depreciated acquisition cost of all special tools, 
equipment, and furnishings acquired from the franchisor 
or sources approved by the franchisor that were recom-
mended or required by the franchisor and are in good and 
usable condition; and 
(e) the cost of transporting, handling, packing, and 
loading powersport vehicles, supplies, parts , accessories, 
signs, special tools, equipment, and furnishings. 
(2) The franchisor shall pay the franchisee the amounts 
specified in Subsection (1) within 90 days after the tender of 
the property to the franchisor if the franchisee: 
(a) has clear title to the property; and 
(b) is in a position to convey title to the franchisor. 
(3) If repurchased inventory and equipment are subject to a 
security interest, the franchisor may make payment jointly to 
the franchisee and to the holder of the security mterest. 2002 
CHAPTER 36 
UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL AND SEXUALLY 
EXPLICIT EMAIL ACT 
Section 
13-36-101. Title. 
13-36-102. Definitions. 
13-36-103. Unsolicited commercial or sexually explicit 
email — Requirements. 
13-36-104. Criminal penalty 
13-36-105. Civil action for violation — Election on dam-
ages — Costs and attorney fees — Defense. 
13-36-101. Title. 
S e ^ X a d t E^Z"»he "UnS°liClted ° ~ i a l ^ 
13-36-102. Defini t ions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) aCommercia]'' means for the purpose of promoting 
the sale, lease, or exchange of jfoods. services, or real 
property. 
(2) "Computer network" mean.- two or more computers 
that are interconnected to exchange electronic messages, 
files, data, or other information 
(3) ''Email" means an electronic message, file, data, 01 
other information that is transmitted: 
(a; between two or mor^ computers, computer net-
works, or electronic terminals: or 
(h) withm a computer network. 
(4) "Email address'' means -« destination, commonly 
expressed as a string of characters, to which email may be 
sent or delivered 
(5) "Email service provider" means a person that: 
(a) is an intermediary m <he transmission of email 
from the sender to the recipient: or 
(b; provides to end users of email service the 
ability to send and receive i-smail. 
(6) "Internet domain name' ' means a globally unique, 
hierarchical reference to an Internet host or service, 
assigned through centralized Internet authorities, com-
prising a series of character strings separated by periods, 
with the right-most string spe' ifying the top of the hier-
archy. 
(7) (a) "Sexually explicit email" means an email thai 
contains, promotes, or contains an electronic link to 
material that i* harmful to minors, as defined in 
Section 76-10-1201. 
(b) An email is a "sexually explicit email" if it 
meets the definition in Subsection (7)(a), even if the 
email also meets the definition of a commercial email. 
(8) (a) "'Unsolicited'' means without the recipient's ex-
press permission, except i s provided in Subsection 
(8Kb). 
(h) A commercial email is not "unsolicited" if the 
sender has a preexisting business or personal rela-
tionship with the recipient. 2002 
13-36-103. Unsolicited commercia l or sexual ly explicit 
email — Requirements . 
(1) Each person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolic-
ited commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email 
through the intermediary of an email service provider located 
in the state or to an email address held by a resident of the 
state shall: 
(a) conspicuously state in the email the sender's: 
(i) legal name; 
(ii; correct street address; and 
(iii) valid Internet domain name; 
(b) include m the email a subject line that contains: 
(i) for a commercial email "ADV:" as the first four 
characters; or 
(h) for a sexually explicit email, "ADV:ADULT as 
the first nine characters. 
(c) provide the recipient a convenient, no-cost mecha-
nism to notify the sender not to send any future email to 
the recipient, including: 
(i) return email to a valid, functioning return elec-
tronic address; and 
(ii) for a sexually explicit email and if the sender 
has a toll-free telephone number, the sender's toll-
tree telephone number: and 
(d) conspicuously provide in the text of the email a 
notice that: 
(i) informs the recipient that the recipient may 
conveniently and at no cost be excluded from future 
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commercial or sexually explicit email, as the case 
may be, from the sender; and 
(ii) for a sexually explicit email and if the sender 
has a toll-free telephone number, includes the send-
er's valid, toll-free telephone number that the recipi-
ent may call to be excluded from future email from 
the sender. 
(2) A person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolicited 
commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email 
through the intermediary of an email sendee provider located 
in the state or to an email address held by a resident of the 
state may not: 
(a) use a third party's Internet domain name in identi-
fying the point of origin or in stat ing the transmission 
path of the email without the third party's consent; 
(b) misrepresent any information in identifying the 
point of origin or the transmission path of the email; or 
(c) fail to include in the email the information neces-
sary to identify the point of origin of the email. 
(3) If the recipient of an unsolicited commercial email or an 
unsolicited sexually explicit email notifies the sender tha t the 
recipient does not want to receive future commercial email or 
future sexually explicit email, respectively from the sender, 
the sender may not send that recipient a commercial email or 
a sexually explicit email, as the case may be, either directly or 
through a subsidiary or affiliate. 2002 
13-36-104. Criminal penalty. 
(1) A person who violates any requirement of Section 13-
36-103 with respect to an unsolicited sexually explicit email is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) A criminal conviction or a penalty assessed as a result of 
a criminal conviction under Subsection (1) does not relieve the 
person convicted or assessed from civil liability in an action 
under Section 13-36-105. 2002 
13-36-105. Civil action for v io lat ion — Elect ion on 
damages — Costs and at torney fees — De-
fense. 
(1) For any violation of a provision of Section 13-36-103, an 
action may be brought by: 
(a) a person who received the unsolicited commercial 
email or unsolicited sexually explicit email with respect to 
which the violation under Section 13-36-103 occurred; or 
(b) an email service provider through whose facilities 
the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexually 
explicit email was transmitted. 
(2) In each action under Subsection (1): 
(a) a recipient or email service provider may: 
(i) recover actual damages; or 
(ii) elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the 
lesser of: 
(A) $10 per unsolicited commercial email or 
unsolicited sexually explicit email received by 
the recipient or transmitted through the email 
service provider; or 
(B) $25,000 per day tha t the violation occurs: 
and 
(b) each prevailing recipient or email service provider 
shall be awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
(3) An email service provider does not violate Section 13-
36-103 solely by being an intermediary between the sender 
and recipient in the transmission of an email that violates 
tha t section. 
(4) The violation of Section 13-36-103 by an employee does 
not subject the employee's employer to liability under that 
section if the employee's violation of Section 13-36-103 is also 
a violation of an established policy of the employer that 
requires compliance with the requirements of Section 13-36-
103. 
(5) It is a defense to an action brought under this section 
that the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexually 
explicit email was transmitted accidenrally 2002 
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13-37-101. Title [Effective January 1, 2004]. 
This chapter is known as the "Notice of Intent to Sell 
Nonpublic Personal Information Act." 2003 
13-37-102. Definitions [Effective January 1, 2004]. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that controls, is con-
trolled by, or is under common control with: 
(a) a commercial entity: and 
(b) (i) directly; or 
(ii) indirectly through one or more intermedi-
aries. 
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (2)(b), "commercial en-
tity" means a person that: 
(i) has an office or other place of business 
located in the state; and 
(ii) in the ordinary course of business trans-
acts a consumer transaction in this state, 
(b) "Commercial entity" does not include: 
(i) a governmental entity; or 
(ii) an entity providing services on behalf of a 
governmental entity. 
(3) "Compensation" means anything of economic value 
that is paid or transferred to a commercial entity for or in 
direct consideration of the disclosure of nonpublic per-
sonal information. 
(4) (a) "Consumer transaction" means: 
(i) a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, 
or other written or oral transfer or disposition: 
(A) that is initiated or completed in this 
state: and 
(B) of: 
(I) goods; 
(II) services; or 
(III) other tangible or intangible 
property, except securities and insur-
ance or services related thereto; or 
